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1.

TijE PROBLEM AND ITS ORIGINS

injuries allegedly caused by the negligent manufacture of safety fuses used in blasting operations in a coal mine
were suffered by Raymond Davis, apparently a citizen of Arkansas.
The manufacturer, Ensign-Bickford Company, was a Connecticut
corporation that could not be personally served with process within
Arkansas. But it happened that two foreign corporations, amenable to process in the state, were indebted in substantial amounts
to Ensign-Bickford Company. Accordingly, counsel for Davis, invoking the diversity jurisdiction, filed an action in the District
Court for the Western District of Arkansas. Without issue of summons, the plaintiff, in conformity with Arkansas statutes, sued out
orders of general attachment, for notice by publication, and for
warning the defendant. The two debtor corporations, having been
garnished, answered and admitted their indebtedness to the defendant. The defendant appeared specially to object to the jurisdiction of the court; judgment was entered quashing and vacating
the writs of attachment and garnishment, and dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that in the federal courts "Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by means of attachment."' The question to be considered here is: In heaven's name, why not?
The subject has been rather fully considered in the literature,
if scattered contributions, especially some by student writers in the
law reviews, are considered as a whole.2 Yet there is something to
ERSONAL

Professor of Law, The Law School, The University of Chicago.-Ed.
1 Davis v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 139 F.2d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 1944).
2 See 7 MooRE's FEDmtAL PRACrcE, 64.09 (2d ed. 1955); Blume, Actions Quasi in Rem
Under Section 1655, Title 28, U.S.C., 50 MICH. L. Rav. 1 (1951); Note, 28 So. CAL. L. REv.

188 (1955); Note, 68 HAv.L. REv. 367 (1954); Note, 84 CoRNu L.Q. 103 (1948); Note, 25
CoRNi.IL L.Q. 448 (1940); Note, 13 So. CAL. L. R,.. 361 (1940); Note, 18 N.C.L. Rv.51

(1939).
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be said for a review that will at least bring together the critical
observations that have been made, and may perhaps make some
modest contribution to their reinforcement. Moreover, a reconsideration of the problem is timely in view of the continuing study
of the rules of practice and procedure, prescribed by the Supreme
Court, that is just being initiated by the Judicial Conference of
the United States. 3 This is particularly true in light of the fact
that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in the Davis case,
cast doubt on the ability of the Supreme Court to deal with the
problem within the framework in which the rule-making power
4
has been exercised.
The anomalous defect of jurisdiction in the federal courtsthis lack of power to provide a remedy that state courts clearly may
provide-is traceable to two unfortunate decisions of the Supreme
Court in years long past.5 It ought to be corrected. It might be
corrected simply through the operation of the judicial process, by
disapproval of the unfortunate decisions of yesteryear. The
chances of litigation are such, however, that there is no ground for
hope that a case presenting the question will come before the
Court in the near future. It may and should be corrected by the
Court through the exercise of its power to prescribe "the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts. . . ." A rule authorizing the acquisition of jurisdiction quasi in rem by attachment or garnishment of
property within the district7 would in no wise enlarge the jurisdiction of the district courts beyond that conferred upon them by
Congress. It would only rectify an anomaly of the Court's own
making.
The seeds of trouble were sown early, though they probably
seemed fairly innocuous at the time. In Hollingsworth v. Adams"
a writ of foreign attachment was sued out in the circuit court for

3 See 28 U.S.C.

§ 331 (1958).

4 139 F.2d at 626. By implication, the court's treatment of the matter as jurisdictional
cast a cloud on the power of the Supreme Court to deal with it through the rule-making
authority. While the court referred only to FED. R. Civ. P. 82 for the principle that
"These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district
courts of the United States... " and while there was no similar provision in the enabling
act, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), it is of course clear that only Congress may "extend or limit" the
jurisdiction of the district courts.
5 Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300 (1838); Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 US.
31 (1913).

6 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
7 Or perhaps within the state; see FE. R. Crv. P. 4 (f); Mississippi Pub. Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
82 U.S. (2 Dall.) 396 (C.C.D.Pa. 1798).
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the district of Pennsylvania against a citizen of Delaware. Counsel
for the defendant "moved to quash the writ on the ground that the
federal courts had no jurisdiction, in cases of Foreign Attachments," 9 and quoted from the eleventh section of the First
Judiciary Act:
"... no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in
another, in any civil action before a circuit or district court.
And no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts
against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original
process, in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving
the writ ....10
Counsel for the plaintiff "wished for time to enquire into the practice; but not being able, on the next day, to assign any satisfactory
reason in maintenance of the action, the court directed the writ to
be quashed, with costs."' 1
One suffers a passing twinge of regret on account of counsel's
lack of ingenuity. He might have cited the process act, with its
provision that "the forms of writs and executions.., and modes of
process ... in the circuit and district courts, in suits at common
law, shall be the same in each state respectively as are now used or
allowed in the supreme courts of the same."'12 The Judiciary Act
certainly established territorial limits on the effectiveness of personal service; the process act appeared to authorize the use of
modes of process authorized by state law, and hence to permit the
acquisition of jurisdiction quasi in rem by seizure of property
within the district. If the two acts were construed together, might
it not reasonably be concluded that the Judiciary Act did no more
than limit the territorial range of personal service, leaving intact
the jurisdiction of the court over property within the district where
personal service was not required?13 Counsel might also have cited
section 12 of the Judiciary Act, dealing with removal of causes and
providing that "any attachment of the goods or estate of the defendant by the original process, shall hold the goods or estate so
attached, to answer the final judgment in the same manner as by
the laws of such state they would have been holden to answer final
judgment had it been rendered by the court in which the suit
9 Ibid.
10 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789).
112 U.S. (2 DalI.) 896.
12 1 Stat. 93 (1789); id. at 275, 276 (1792).
18 Cf. FD. R. Civ. P. 4 (f).
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commenced."'1 4 The grant of jurisdiction of actions quasi in rem
upon removal would have been hard to reconcile with the supposed
absence of such jurisdiction in original cases. But such arguments
would probably have proved futile.
The eleventh section of the Judiciary Act was more than a territorial limitation on the effectiveness of personal service. In
modern terminology, it was a venue statute as well. Without distinguishing between actions in personam and actions quasi in rem,
it conferred on the defendant a privilege not to be sued in the
federal courts except in the district of which he was an inhabitant,
or in which he was found at the time of service of process. It was
a somewhat strange venue statute, since the appropriate place of
trial coincided precisely with the appropriate place for service of
personal process.' 5 Under the general venue provisions of the
present Judicial Code' 6 it may often happen that process is validly
served upon a defendant in a place where venue is improper. Yet
the provision for venue in any district in which the defendant
might be "found" was characteristic of federal practice until
1887; 17 there can be no doubt as to the character of section 11 of
the Judiciary Act as a venue statute. The merger of the concepts
of personal jurisdiction and venue undoubtedly accounts in large
measure for the confusion of those concepts in the early cases.
When venue was improper, personal service on the defendant was
also defective; the objection could be stated in terms of the one or
the other, and tended to be stated in terms of jurisdiction. The
identification of the two concepts where personal service was required carried over to cases in which it was not required, as in
actions quasi in rem, leading to the confused impression that the
objection to proceeding by attachment or garnishment was jurisdictional, whereas it was in fact only an objection to the venue.
The major conclusion to be offered here is that, while venue
statutes may, indeed, limit the utility of attachment and garnishment in the federal courts, there is no jurisdictional obstacle to the
acquisition of jurisdiction quasi in rem by means of such process.
There were early cases of actions begun in the federal courts by
foreign attachment in which no suggestion of a lack of jurisdiction
was made. One of these was Fisherv. Consequa,'8 in which there
14

1 Stat. 79-80 (1789).

15

See HART & WECHSLER, Tim FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 948-49 (1953).

16 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1958).
17 See 24 Stat. 552 (1887), as corrected by 25 Stat. 433 (1888).
18 9 Fed. Cas. 120 (No. 4816) (C.C.D.Pa. 1809).
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was a rule to show cause why the attachment should not be dissolved on other grounds. Among counsel for the defendant was
Mr. Dallas, who had reported the earlier case of Hollingsworth v.
Adams.10 Perhaps the reason why section 11 was not invoked was
that the defendant was "a Hong merchant at Canton, ' 20 so that it
was supposed that he was not "an inhabitant of the United States"
within the protection of that section. Of this there is more to be
said later. On whatever interpretation, the case speaks against
the notion that federal courts lacked jurisdiction in cases commenced by foreign attachment. If the neglect of section 11 was inadvertent, the inference is that the jurisdictional defect was not
part of the working knowledge of members of the bench and bar.
If such actions could be maintained against foreigners, it was not
by reason of a defect of jurisdiction that they could not be maintained against inhabitants of the United States.
Again in Graighle v. Notnagle21 Mr. Justice Washington upheld an original writ of foreign attachment without discussion of
the jurisdictional question. Here, too, the defendant, being a
citizen of France, was arguably outside the protection of section
11.22

In Harrisonv. Rowan 23 a bill in equity was filed in New Jersey
concerning New Jersey land and, the defendants being citizens of
Pennsylvania, process was served upon them there. Section 11 of
the Judiciary Act was invoked; Hollingsworthv. Adams was cited.24
But Mr. Justice Washington held that the objection was waived
by the defendants' appearance without objection. After observing
that the case was cognizable by virtue of diversity of citizenship, the
requisite amount being in controversy, he said:
"That part of [section 11 of the Judiciary Act] which repects the service of process, does not amount to an exception
from the general grant of jurisdiction, but secures to parties
residing out of the district in which the suit is brought, a
privilege of not being liable to be served with process out of
the district in which they reside, or of being compelled by such
service to appear in any other district.... Now it is clear that
10 Note 8 supra.
20 9 Fed. Cas. at 120.
21 10 Fed. Cas. 948 (No. 5679) (C.C.D.Pa. 1816).
22 Perhaps court and counsel overlooked the jurisdictional point because of preoccupation with the plaintiff's ingenious device of self-garnishment. The stratagem was sustained; it was not, in fact, novel.
23 11 Fed. Cas. 657 (No. 6140) (C.C.D.N.J. 1818).
24 Ibid.
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if non-residence formed an objection to the jurisdiction ...
the subsequent appearance could not have given jurisdiction
to the court. But being a mere matter of privilege, it was
waved [sic] by a voluntary appearance which rendered the
service of process unnecessary. "25
The subject was fully considered for the first time by Mr.
Justice Story, on circuit, in Picquet v. Swan.2 8 The action was
brought by an alien, a resident of France, against a citizen of the
United States, formerly of Boston but then residing in France. By
virtue of what was known in Massachusetts as trustee process, "but
• . . better known elsewhere as the process of 'foreign attachment,' ",27 land belonging to the defendant in Massachusetts was
attached. The defendant not appearing, the plaintiff moved for
judgment by default. The motion was opposed by amicus curiae.
Let it be noted at the outset that everything said by Mr. Justice
Story concerning the power of a federal court, utilizing state statutory procedures, to acquire jurisdiction quasi in rem by attachment
or garnishment was pure obiter dictum. This for two reasons: (1)
In the end he held that the action was not within the diversity
jurisdiction because the defendant had been described only as a
citizen of the United States, and not as a citizen of a particular
state.28 (2) Just before the end he held that the attempted service
was "defective and nugatory" under the Massachusetts statutes
themselves. Those statutes provided no method of notifying the
defendant in the peculiar situation before the court, where the defendant, having once been a resident, had not been such for more
than three years; it was a casus omissus.29 Notwithstanding, Mr.
Justice Story at the beginning set out to consider the question of
federal jurisdiction where process could not be served personally
on the defendant in the district; and the considered opinion of so
able a jurist is of course entitled to weight, dictum or not.
Another feature of the decision needs preliminary notice. This
was Mr. Justice Story's treatment of the argument that section 11
was inapplicable because the defendant was not an "inhabitant of
the United States." By an obscure process of reasoning, analysis
of which would be beyond the scope of this paper, he reached the
25 Id. at 658. In this holding the court had the support of Logan v. Patrick, 9 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 288 (1809).
26 19 Fed. Cas. 609 (No. 11134) (C.C.D.Mass. 1828).
27 Ibid.
28 Id. at 616.
29 Ibid.
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conclusion that the clause should be read thus: "no civil suit shall
be brought before either of said courts against an alien or a citizen,
by any original process, in any other district than that, whereof he
is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found, at the time of serving the writ."30 This is an arresting bit of statutory construction,
but it has only collateral relevance to the subject of principal concern here.3 1
Mr. Justice Story held that the federal courts were not authorized to acquire jurisdiction quasi in rem by foreign attachment
or garnishment of property within the district. His reasoning is
none too clear. It is clear that he entertained no idea that there was
something peculiar about the federal courts, stemming from the
Constitution or any other source, subjecting them to this peculiar
disability. The question was whether the process act, construed
together with section 11 of the Judiciary Act, empowered them to
proceed in this manner. The language of the process act, adopting
"the forms of writs .

.

. and modes of process" used in the state

courts, seemed comprehensive enough to cover the case; but Mr.
Justice Story proceeded to whittle down their meaning. After
discussing the limits on the exercise of jurisdiction in personam,
30 Id. at 613.
31 The construction serves to emphasize the perennial inadequacy of the general venue
statutes. See generally Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts, 7
VAND. L. REv. 608 (1954). At all times the federal courts have had jurisdiction, given
the requisite amount in controversy, of suits between an alien and a citizen of a state.
In Mr. Justice Story's time, if the alien was plaintiff, service and venue were proper in the
district of the defendant's residence. If, however, the citizen was plaintiff, action against
the alien was an impossibility unless he was a resident, or was found within the United
States. This was completely true, even if the nonresident alien had property here, if the
federal courts could not entertain original actions quasi in rem upon constructive service,
or if venue was not proper in any district. Thus Mr. Justice Story's construction appears
to have discriminated in favor of aliens and against citizens. Today no venue objection
stands in the way of the citizen's proceeding in diversity cases by attachment or garnishment in the district of his own residence, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a) (1958); abandonment of
the notion that there is "no jurisdiction" to proceed in such manner would suffice.
Indeed, in modem times no venue objection stands in the way of proceeding quasi in
rem against a nonresident alien in any district in which property may be found, whether
diversity is the basis of jurisdiction or not. "An alien may be sued in any district." 28
U.S.C. § 1391 (d). Although this provision appeared for the first time in the 1948 revision
of the Judicial Code, it purported only to state existing law, MooRE's COMMENTARY ON THE
US. JUDICIAL CODE 189 (1949); and, in fact, it appears that the modem cases, ignoring Mr.
Justice Story and Toland v. Sprague, note 52 infra, held that the prior venue provisions had
no application to nonresident aliens, who could be sued in any district in which they could
be served with process. In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893); Sandusky Foundry & Machine
Co. v. De Lavaud, 251 Fed. 631 (D. Ohio 1918); but see Meyer v. Herrera, 41 Fed. 65
(C.C.D. Tex. 1889). It follows that if the notion of jurisdictional defect were abandoned
there would be no obstacle to the maintenance of actions quasi in rem against nonresident
aliens in any district in which property could be found; and this would seem to be a
desirable and beneficial result.
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with emphasis on the frustrated imperialism of the Island of Tobago, 32 he concluded that the process-venue provision of section 11
of the Judiciary Act did no more (with one exception, to be noted)
than declare what would have been the law in the absence of such
a provision. According to established general principles, the
jurisdiction of a state or judicial district was territorially limited.
The provision was inserted out of an abundance of caution, to
negative any inference that Congress intended to exercise its power
to provide for nationwide service of process. In the course of this
discussion, however, Story dearly recognized that states might
proceed quasi in rem without violating established principles:
"Where he is not within such territory, and is not personally
subject to its laws, if on account of his supposed or actual
property being within the territory, process by the local laws
may by attachment go to compel his appearance, and for his
default to appear, judgment may be pronounced against him,
such a judgment must, upon general principles, be deemed
only to bind him to the extent of such property, and cannot
have the effect of a conclusive judgment in personam, for the
plain reason, that except so far as the property is concerned,
it is a judgment coram non judice."33
Why, then, could not the circuit court proceed by foreign attachment, affecting only the property, since state law authorized that
process?
The Judiciary Act itself made no provision for process. Had
it stood alone, Mr. Justice Story was unable to see how the federal
courts could have proceeded at all, "except by reference to writs,
process, and service according to the common law. . .. 11" By a
separate and "temporary" act, no part of the scheme of the Judiciary Act itself, Congress had authorized recourse to the state
practice. How was that act to be construed? In the light of the
common law, "which must necessarily have been in the contemplation of the framers of the judiciary act. . .. ',35 And judgment
without personal appearance was unknown to the common law.
By the common law a defendant "may be taken on a capias and
brought into Court, or distrained by attachment and other process
82 19 Fed. Gas. at 612. See Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 (K.B. 1808).
33 19 Fed. Cas. at 612.
34 Id. at 614.
85 Id. at 613.
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against his property to compel his appearance; and for non-appearance be outlawed. But still, even though a subject, and within the
kingdom, the judgment against him can take place only after such
appearance. So anxious was the common law to guard the rights
of private persons from judgments obtained without notice, and
regular personal appearances in Court." 36 The power to proceed
to judgment binding the property was conferred only by statute.
It would seem that if Congress had intended to limit the federal
courts to common-law rather than statutory process it would have
said so-or would have said nothing, since (according to Mr.
Justice Story) that would have been the consequence of silence.
When, instead, it made available state process, the fact that state
statutes provided for proceedings in attachment and garnishment
"must necessarily have been in the contemplation of the framers....
." Why this manhandling of the process act?
It is evident that Mr. Justice Story entertained sentiments of
hostility against the exercise of jurisdiction based on the existence
of property in the state without proper personal service:
"If the state jurisprudence authorizes its own courts to take
cognizance of suits against nonresidents, by summoning their
tenants, attornies, or agents, or attaching their property,
whether it be a farm or a debt, or a glove, or a chip, it is not for
us to say, that such legislation may not be rightful, and bind
the state courts. But when the circuit courts are called upon
to adopt the same rule, it ought to be seen, that Congress have,
37
in an unambiguous manner, made it imperative upon them."
SO Ibid. It takes a sardonic sense of humor to regard the process of outlawry as an
expression of the common law's solicitude for the defendant. ".... [I]n its modem form
it can scarcely be said to have any tendency even to apprise the defendant of the action,
much less to warn him by distinct and repeated summons. In fact, he is never summoned
during the whole course of the proceeding.... A defendant against whom judgment of
outlawry passes has therefore in general had no previous notice that the suit has been
commenced, and may probably have had no opportunity of becoming acquainted with
that fact, and it is quite possible that even his property may be seized and sold, and the
proceeds paid over to the plaintiff, before he is aware that any action is pending against
him." First Report of Commissioners on the Courts of Common Law [1829], PARLIAMENTARY PAPERs 93-94, quoted in 9 HOLDSWORII, HmORY OF ENGLISn LAW 254-55 (1926).
Holdsworth himself says, "It is obvious, therefore, that the use of outlawry as mesne
process to enforce appearance might work very serious oppression." 9 HoLDswoRTH, op.
cit. supra at 255; and he refers to it as "this mischievous procedure." Ibid. Outlawry
involved forfeiture of all the defendant's goods and chattels to the Crown, 3 BLACKStONE,
COMMENTARES 283-84. Apparently the plaintiff's demand was paid upon his making
application to the Crown office. See Campbell v. Morris, 3 Harr. & McH. 535, 546 (Md.
1797) (argument of counsel).
37 19 Fed. Cas. at 614.
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The concern over the lack of notice to the defendant, or its adequacy, is understandable. Yet the modern legal mind can react
only with the thought that that is a problem to be solved by requiring reasonable notice, not by rejecting a remedy beneficial to local
people. At all events, the Supreme Court later gave its unqualified
endorsement to the use by the states of the process of foreign attachment, with less concern for the realities of notice than would
be indulged today.38 But there is more than concern with notice.
Repeated references in the opinion to the possibility that property
of trifling value might be attached, with the result that the nonresident defendant would be required to come great distances to
protect himself against a judgment in invitum, 39 suggest that the
learned Justice was confusing two distinct ideas. The first was
that the presence of any property of the defendant in the state may
provide a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over him in personam; the second was only that the property may be taken to
satisfy a judgment having no further force and effect. Why would
a creditor bother to attach a glove or a chip, or a debtor travel
great distances to defend such an action, unless it were thought that
the judgment would be binding in personam? Although Mr.
Justice Story exhibited clear understanding of the limited effect
of judgments quasi in rem, he seems to have been unable to put out
of his mind entirely the possibility that judgments based on property
in the state might somehow be given effect as personally binding
adjudications. At any rate, only six years later, in his treatise, he
cleanly separated the two ideas. There he first discussed the practice followed by some nations of proceedings in personam on the
basis of attachment, or of citations viis et modis, concluding that
judgments so obtained are nullities except in the countries where
they are obtained. 40 Then, in separate sections, he discussed the
normal proceeding by foreign attachment without hostility:
"In such cases, for all the purposes of the suit, the existence
of such property, within the territory, constitutes a just ground
of proceeding, to enforce the rights of the plaintiff, to the extent of subjecting such property to excution upon the decree
or judgment. But it is to be treated to all intents and purposes, if the defendant has never appeared and contested the
suit, as a mere proceeding in rem, and not personally binding
38 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 8:Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
39 19 Fed. Cas. at 613-16.
40 STORY, CoNFLICr oF LAws 457-58 (1st ed. 1834).
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on the party as a decree or judgment in personam. In other
countries, it is uniformly so treated, and' considered,
as having
41

no extra-territorial force or obligation.

It is possible that there was a reason, other than the apparent
confusion of ideas, for the hostility expressed in Picquet v. Swan
to proceedings by attachment. In 1828 there was, of course, no
due process clause to prevent a state from giving in personam effect
to its own judgments based on the existence of property in the
state. Other states might refuse them such effect; but if the defendant should later find himself in the courts of the rendering
state, or should acquire other property there, there was nothing to
stop the courts of that state from treating the judgment (based,
perhaps, on the attachment of property of nominal value) as res
judicata, and as having the full effect of a valid personal judgment.
This may explain the hostility toward loose proceedings by attachment in general. It cannot, however, explain why Mr. Justice
Story denied the power of the federal courts to entertain "bona
fide" 42 attachment suits, when he had-and exercised 43-the authority to declare that the judgments in such actions in the federal
courts would be strictly limited in their effect to the property
attached.
That Mr. Justice Story was preoccupied with attachment in the
state courts, and its possible abuse there, also seems indicated by
his failure to take account of the jurisdictional requirement as to
the amount in controversy when he spoke of the possibility of
attaching property of trifling value. From 1789 to 1887 the required amount in controversy was $500; and so the attachment of
a glove or a chip in an action in the federal courts would not have
been possible unless the claim stated by the plaintiff, rather than
41 Id. at 461. Moreover, he maintained that such judgments, as in rem judgments,
were entitled to recognition in other countries. Id. at 495-96. Yet a trace of the old
suspicion remains. The attachment of property of nominal value, such as a chip or a
cane, is still mentioned, and contrasted with the "bona fide" attachment of property within
the territory. Id. at 461. It was only cases of bona fide attachment that were the subject
of the quotation in the text.
42 See note 41 supra.
43 "There are two reasons, which have great weight with me in support of these
positions. One is, that otherwise the judgments in the courts of the United States would
not, in cases of non-residents, be binding, as general judgments in personam; but if at all,
only as proceedings in rem to the extent of the property attached, whether it be a chip,
or a bale of goods.. " 19 Fed. Cas. at 615. This is the one completely baffling passage
in the opinion. In the first place, why "if at all"? More important, why deplore judgments
good only to the extent of the property attached? The property may be sufficient to
satisfy the claim; if not, part of a loaf is better than none, and why should it be denied
to resident creditors? Can any explanation be given for this passage?
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the value of the property, could be regarded as determinative. The
question of how the amount in controversy is to be determined in
an attachment case appears not to have been litigated, though it
might have arisen in removal cases; 44 but from our present point of
vantage, at least, the answer seems dear. If the nonresident defendant is permitted to make a limited appearance to defend his
interest in the property without subjecting himself personally to
the jurisdiction of the court,45 there can be no doubt that the

amount in controversy is limited to the value of the property. And
whether such a limited appearance is permitted or not, it is only
the value of the property, and not the plaintiff's larger claim, that
can measure the amount in controversy in the absence of personal
jurisdiction, since the court may not render a personal judgment
but can only enter a judgment affecting the property.
The final point to be noticed in connection with the Picquet
case concerns the exception to Mr. Justice Story's position that the
process-venue clause of article 11 was merely declaratory. Congress, said Mr. Justice Story, "designedly enlarged the power to
proceed in cases of inhabitancy, where the party happened at the
time to be absent without any intentional change of domicile.... ,,11

That is to say, that an action may be commenced by attachment in
the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, even though he
cannot be personally served therein. There are two possible views
of this interesting dictum. Perhaps Mr. Justice Story was presciently anticipating the validity of personal jurisdiction over absent domiciliaries, based on constructive service. 7 The idea of
jurisdiction in personam over an absent citizen, or subject, at least,
was familiar to the continental jurist whose writings were known
to him. 48

It seems more likely, however, that Mr. Justice Story

meant that under section 11 of the Judiciary Act an original proceeding by attachment was proper in the district of which the defendant was an inhabitant even though personal process could not
be validly served on him.49 If this is so, the authority of a federal
court to entertain an action begun by attachment cannot depend
44

See part III infra.

45 See

text at note 178 infra.

46 19 Fed. Cas. at 613.

47 The validity of such service was not established until Milliken v. Meyer, 311 US.
457 (1940), though it was hinted in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
48 See STORY, CONFLIcr or LAWs 450-51 (1st ed. 1834).
49 "But as to citizens of a country, domiciled abroad, the extent of jurisdiction, which
may be lawfully exercised over them in personam, is not so clear upon acknowledged
principles. ... Whatever authority should be given to such judgments, must be purely
ex comitate." Id. at 451-52.

HeinOnline -- 59 Mich. L. Rev. 348 1960-1961

1961]

ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT

upon whether it has jurisdiction of the defendant's person; even
without such jurisdiction, the action may be maintained where
venue is proper, as it is in the district of the defendant's residence.
In sum: Mr. Justice Story, in the teeth of the plain language of
the process act, denied that Congress had conferred on the federal
courts authority to entertain actions against nonresidents, commenced by attachment or garnishment, without personal jurisdiction, when such proceedings were authorized by state law. He did
so, first, because under his interpretation of the Judiciary Act of
1789, venue was improper. He did so, second, because he deprecated such proceedings, since they might take place with no
notice, or inadequate notice, to the nonresident, and since, contrary
to established general principles, they might be given the effect of
personal judgments in the states of their rendition. Now that it
has been long and firmly established, under the due process clause,
that such judgments can be given no effect in the absence of reasonable notice, and that in any event they can be given effect only
with respect to the property attached, and not as personal judgments,50 Mr. Justice Story's doubts and fears can be no obstacle to
the Supreme Court's authorizing such proceedings, through the
exercise of its rule-making power, in cases where venue is proper.5 '
The problem must have been intriguing, if not pressing; for in
1838, in Toland v. Sprague,52 the Supreme Court contrived, as if
by main force, an occasion to consider and determine it. In 1834
a citizen of Pennsylvania began an action in the circuit court for
the eastern district of that state against a citizen of Massachusetts,
attaching property in the hands of certain residents of Pennsylvania. A motion to quash the attachment was overruled; the defendant entered special bail, appeared and pleaded on the merits,
and the case was tried to a jury, which rendered a verdict for the
defendant.5 3 Previous cases5 4 had made it reasonably dear, and
the Court was to hold, that, whatever the nature of the objection
5o Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Harris v. Balk, 198 US. 215 (1905).
51 Three years later Mr. Justice Story again denied the authority with a curt reference
to § 11 of the Judiciary Act. He did not cite his decision in Picquet v. Swan, nor refer
to the process act. The objection was made by plea to the jurisdiction. Richmond v.
Dreyfous, I Sumner 131 (C.C.R.I. 1831).
52 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 800 (1838).
53 These circumstances are evidence that, despite the holdings in the Hollingsworth
and Picquet cases, the bench and bar continued to believe that original proceedings by
attachment were proper, at least where the defendant was not a resident of the United
States. In the instant case the record showed that, although the defendant was a citizen
of Massachusetts, he was a resident of Gibraltar. Id. at 302. See also note 63 infra.
54 See note 25 supra.
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to attachment proceedings in the federal courts-whether it was
the lack of personal service, or improper venue-the objection
could be waived, and was waived by the entry of special bail and
general appearance. 55 Yet Mr. Justice Barbour, for the majority
of the Court, announced that the first question to be discussed was
"whether the process of foreign attachment can be properly used
by the circuit courts of the United States, in cases where the defendant is domiciled abroad, and not found within the district in
which the process issues, so that it can be served upon him?"56
That question, said Mr. Justice Barbour, had been elaborately
argued in Picquetv. Swan, with the reasoning of which the majority
concurred; therefore the Supreme Court's decision would be
limited to a condensation of Mr. Justice Story's opinion on circuit.
Here, then, it is necessary only to notice the two respects in which
the Supreme Court's restatement of the argument clarified or departed from Mr. Justice Story's original version.
First, as to the puzzling construction of the phrase "inhabitant
of the United States" 57 as including, and extending the privilege
of section 11 to, citizens residing abroad and nonresident aliens:
Mr. Justice Barbour's explanation was simple, and clearer than
Mr. Justice Story's. Congress contemplated that process could not
be served upon such persons at all, unless they should be found
within the district; hence there was no occasion to provide for them
a privilege they already possessed. 58 This explanation assumed the
validity of the proposition that personal service is necessary in all
cases, including cases of attachment or garnishment. It is all very
well to say that there is no occasion to make venue provisions for
cases in which personal service cannot be had, if personal service is
required; but if personal service is not required in cases of attachment and garnishment, then the limitation of section 11 to "inhabitants of the United States" is meaningful, and indicates a congressional willingness to allow such actions to proceed against nonresidents of the United States in any district in which property can
be found.
56 87 US. (12 Pet.) at 830-81.
56 Id. at 827.
57 See 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789).

58 "... [A]nd that as to all those who were not within the United States, it was not
in the contemplation of congress, that they would be at all subject, as defendants, to the
process of the circuit courts, which, by reason of their being in a foreign jurisdiction,
could not be served upon them; and therefore, there was no provision whatsoever made
in relation to them." 87 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 829-80.
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Second, Mr. Justice Story's apparent confusion concerning the
effect of a judgment in rem was compounded by Mr. Justice Barbour. He indicates no awareness at all of the limited function of
the judgment as subjecting the attached property to the satisfaction
of the claim. He simply assumes that the defendant in attachment
gets no notice (because he cannot be personally served within the
district), and that the judgment entered against him is a personal
one:
"Nothing can be more unjust, than that a person should
have his rights passed upon, and finally decided by a tribunal;
without some process being served upon him, by which he will
have notice, which will enable him to appear and defend himself. This principle is strongly laid down in Buchanan v.
Rucker, 9 East 192. Now, it is not even contended, that the
circuit courts could proceed to judgment against a person who
was domiciled without the United States, and not found within
the judicial district, so as to be served with process, where the
party had no property within such district. We would ask
what difference there is, in reason, between the cases in which
he has, and has not such property? In the one case, as in the
other, the court renders judgment against a person who has no
notice of the proceeding. In the one case, as in the other, they
are acting on the rights of a person who is beyond the limits of
their jurisdiction, and upon whom they have no power to
cause process to be personally served. If there be such a
difference, we are unable to perceive it."59
At least since Pennoyerv. Neff,60 any competent law student should
be able to perceive the difference, provided the proceeding is directed specifically against the property, and there is reasonable
notice. Whether Mr. Justice Barbour should have been expected
to perceive it is a question of minor interest.6 ' But Joseph Story

9 ld. at 329
60 95

(emphasis in the original).

U.S. 714 (1877).

01 Philip P. Barbour, of Virginia, died only five years after his appointment to the
Court in 1836. See 1 Dicr. AMER. BIoG. 594-96 (1943). His chief distinction seems to have
been his career-long opposition to interpretation of the Constitution in such a way as to
enhance federal authority, judicial and other. He had been counsel for the state in Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME CoUT IN UNITED
STATEs His-roR" 548, 665 n. (1937). When Marshall thought of retiring as Chief Justice in
1831, John Quincy Adams wrote: "The terror is that, if he should be now withdrawn,
some shallow-pated wild-cat like Philip P. Barbour, fit for nothing but to tear the Union
to rags and tatters, would be appointed in his place." 1 id. at 752.
Adams's characterization has been regarded as extreme, I id. at 753; but on Barbour's
death Story paid him a damaging compliment: "He was a man.., of considerable legal
attainments (in which he was daily improving) .... 2 id. at 78.
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still sat on the Court. His treatise, published four years earlier,
had clearly perceived and expounded the difference between actions in personam, predicated on property in the state, and bona
fide actions quasi in rem. 62 How he could have concurred in so
unperceptive a rendition of his opinion in the Picquet case passes
understanding.
Mr. Chief Justice Taney strongly protested against the part of
the opinion denying the power of the circuit courts to proceed by
attachment. The holding was not necessary to the decision; the
question was not free from difficulty; the practice of attachment had
been followed in several districts, and the holding might unsettle
titles acquired thereby.6 3 Mr. Justice Baldwin agreed, adding that
"if it was necessary, he would go further, as to the authority of the
courts of the United States to issue foreign attachment."6 4 Mr.
Justice Wayne also agreed with the Chief Justice, adding that "He
thought the circuit courts of the United States had authority to
issue foreign attachments." 65 Mr. Justice Catron also agreed, but
"had not formed any opinion on the question of the right of the
'
Thus the cornercircuit courts to issue foreign attachments."66
stone of the limiting doctrine, which persists to this day, is a glaring
dictum, wholly unnecessary to the decision, concurred in by a bare
majority of the Court, and infected with a total lack of understanding of the function of a proceeding quasi in rem.
II.

THE CONFORMITY ACT AND THE AMENDED VENUE STATUTE

Section 6 of the Conformity Act6 7 provided:
"... in common-law causes in the circuit and district courts
of the United States the plaintiff shall be entitled to similar
remedies, by attachment or other process against the property
of the defendant, which are now provided for by the laws of
the State in which such court is held, applicable to the courts
of such state ... "
The legislative history is silent as to the purpose of this provision.68
But the background that has been sketched would seem to make
See notes 40, 41, supra.
63 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 337.
64 Ibid.
65 Id. at 337-38.
66 Id. at 338.
B7 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872).
68 What became § 6 was discussed on the floor of the Senate only with respect to a
provision, not included in the quotation in the text, authorizing the courts, by rule, to
62
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that purpose unmistakably clear. By the first Judiciary Act Congress had made applicable the forms of writs and modes of process
used in the state courts. Although counsel repeatedly relied on
this general language as authorizing proceedings by attachment and
garnishment in accordance with state law, the courts had held that
it did not do so in the absence of personal jurisdiction of the defendant. Undoubtedly this caused inconvenience, obstructing as
it did the American creditor's right of access to local assets of creditors residing abroad. Hence Congress provided in specific terms
for remedies "by attachment or other process against the property
of the defendant." It could hardly be plainer that Congress was
attempting to change the rule that actions could not be commenced
in the federal courts by attachment or garnishment, without personal service, if state law so provided.
An argument to this effect was addressed to Mr. Justice Miller
on circuit, only to be rejected. In Nazro v. Cragin6" an assignee in
bankruptcy sued in the court of his appointment, attaching property of a citizen of Wisconsin. Of section 6 of the Conformity Act
Mr. Justice Miller said:
"[I]n my opinion, it was not intended by congress to make
the great change for which the assignee's counsel here contends. It would compel citizens of the Pacific coast to go to
New York to defend their property which happened to be
there and would give the great central cities vast power. I cannot but think that a change so radical would have been expressed by congress in unmistakable language. And this view
is strengthened by the consideration that no publication is
provided for by the section under consideration, while a subsequent section of the same act does provide for publication
in respect to certain suits in equity.
"The effect of this section in the act of 1872 is simply this:
If the court has or can acquire jurisdiction over the defendant
personally this section gives to the plaintiff the right to the
auxiliary remedy by attachment,
but it does not afford a means
70
of acquiring jurisdiction."
So far as notice is concerned, presumably Congress intended that
the notice provided by state law should be given. The reference
adopt changes made from time to time in the state laws. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess.
2493 (1872) [covering 1871-72).
69 17 Fed. Cas. 1259 (No. 10062) (C.C.D. Iowa 1874).
70 Ibid. Observe that this means that section 6 effected no change in the prior law.
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to power in the "great central cities" is unintelligible from this
distance. As for the hardship that would be imposed on residents
of the Pacific coast who would be required to go to New York to
defend their property, Mr. Justice Miller and others responsible
for the defect of jurisdiction cannot escape from the difficulty
confronting those who, like the present author, would correct it:
what practical difference does it make whether the New York
creditor can sue by attachment in the federal court in New York,
since he can undoubtedly do so in the state courts, 7 1 and thereby
place the resident of the Pacific coast under the same compulsion?7 2
In 1880 the Court-again by way of dictum-reaffirmed the
doctrine that "an attachment is but an incident to a suit, and unless
the suit can be maintained the attachment must fall."73 No cases
were cited, and there was no reference to section 6 of the Conformity Act. Since the defendant resided in Massachusetts, and
was not found in Iowa, where the action was brought, the venue
was doubtless improper under section I I of the Judiciary Act; but
that is all that can be said in favor of the dictum.
In the course of the next seven years the lower courts followed
the jurisdictional doctrine announced by the Supreme Court,
though with some uncertainty. In Anderson v. Shaffer 4 the
venue was clearly improper, but, as usual, the holding was in terms
of jurisdiction. In Lovejoy v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.75 the court,
while doubting that section 6 of the Conformity Act had altered
71 Le, where there is concurrent jurisdiction, as in diversity cases and cases arising
under federal law generally.
72 The practical reasons for rectifying the anomalous defect of jurisdiction will be
discussed in Part IV infra.
The result in the instant case, though not the reasoning, may be justified on the ground
that the venue remained improper under section 11 of the Judiciary Act.
The case departed from precedent in allowing the "jurisdictional" objection to be
asserted on appeal after answer and trial on the merits. See note 25 supra. On principles
shortly to be established, Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878), the defendant was entitled
to preserve his objection and assert it on appeal if it was an objection to jurisdiction of
his person. Query whether the same principle applies to the venue objection, which was
the only tenable one. Cf. Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943); Neirbo v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939); In re Louisville Underwriters,
134 U.S. 488 (1890).
73 Ex parte Des Moines & M.R.R., 103 U.S. 794, 796 (1880). The circuit court having
dissolved the attachment and dismissed the suit, the plaintiff sought mandamus in an
original proceeding in the Supreme Court. The motion was denied "1, because it is an
attempt to use the writ of mandamus as a writ of error to bring here for review the
judgment of the Circuit Court upon a plea to the jurisdiction filed in the suit; and, 2, because if a writ of mandamus could be used for such a purpose the judgment below was
clearly right."
74 10 Fed. 266 (C.CS.D. Ohio 1881).
75 11 Fed. 63 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1882).
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the pre-existing law as to commencement of an action by foreign
attachment, directed a verdict against the plaintiffs on the merits.
In Erstein v. Rothschild 6 the court, while entertaining an attachment suit, reaffirmed the doctrine by way of dictum; 77 but there
was no inconsistency since the action was brought in the district
of the defendants' residence, and they entered a general appearance. Thus there was no defect of either personal jurisdiction or
venue. In Boston Electric Co. v. Electric Gas Lighting Co. 7 8 the
doctrine was followed, with the remarkable feature that the court
cited Pennoyer v. Neff9 for the proposition that "Courts of the
United States cannot acquire jurisdiction by an attachment of
property merely, but there must be a personal service of the writ
or process upon the defendant, or a voluntary appearance."80
Finally, in Noyes v. Canada8 ' the doctrine was reiterated and applied with an extreme emphasis on its jurisdictional character.
Although the defendant, a resident of Canada, had entered a
general appearance without objecting to jurisdiction or venue, the
court allowed the garnishees, who claimed to own the property
attached, to move to set aside the attachment. If it is true that
section 11 of the Judiciary Act merely conferred a personal privilege on the defendant not to be sued outside the district of which
he was an inhabitant, or in which he might be found, 2 this decision
is unjustified whether the objection to original proceedings by
attachment is lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue.
In 1887 there was a development of major, but neglected, importance. Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 17893 was amended
to read as follows:
...

and no civil suit shall be brought before either of said

courts against any person by any original process of [sic] proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an
76 22 Fed. 61 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1884).
77 Id. at 65.

78 23 Fed. 838 (C.C.D. Mass. 1885).
70 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
80 23 Fed. at 839. Another unusual feature of the case is that the defendants were
foreign corporations having their principal places of business in Boston. There would
thus have been no objection to the venue, nor any lack of personal jurisdiction, had the
Massachusetts legislature not neglected to provide for process in such cases. Cf. Ex parte
Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1877).
8130 Fed. 665 (C.C.D. Kans. 1887).
82Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 330-31 (1838); Harrison v. Rowan, note
25 supra; Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 260 US. 653, 655 (1923).
BSAs embodied in REv. STAT. § 739 (1875), and carried over by the first section of

the Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. (Pt. 3) 470.
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inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the
fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit
shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either
the plaintiff or the defendant .... ,,s4
This amendment, which is of course the foundation of the present
general venue statutes,s 5 effected two changes: (1) it eliminated
the provision that suit might be brought in any district in which
the defendant might be found;86 (2) in pure diversity cases, it made
venue proper in the district of the plaintiff's residence, while in all
other cases only the district of the defendant's residence was proper.
If the amendment is read from the modern point of view there
is a deceptive aspect that must be carefully avoided. On its face
the amendment seems designed to enlarge the sphere of proper
venue in diversity cases, discriminating against the plaintiff in such
other cases as those arising under federal law.8 7 In the light of the
legislative history this is an inaccurate interpretation. The House
version of the bill 8 would have made no change for nondiversity
cases, leaving the defendant to be sued wherever he could be found;
but in diversity cases venue was restricted to two possible districts,
as opposed to the sixty or seventy 9 in which he might have been
sued, if found, under the prior law. The Senate version, which
became the law, gave the same benefit and more to defendants in
nondiversity cases: the only proper venue was to be in the district
of the defendant's residence. From the standpoint of Congress, the
powers of the federal courts had been greatly curtailed: whereas
previously any defendant could be sued in any district in which the
plaintiff could catch him, venue was now proper in only two districts in diversity cases, and in only one in all others.
Moreover, it is clear that there was no intention of extending
the range of process against the person. Senator Mitchell, of
Oregon, understood the amendment as authorizing a citizen of
84 24 Stat. 552-53 (1887).
85 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1958).
86 This was the result of Senate amendments, 18 CONG. Rac., Pt. 3, 2542 (1887). The
original House version retained the language "in which he shall be found" while limiting
venue in diversity cases to the district of residence of either party. 18 CONG. RFc. 613 (1887).
The changes noted in the text are those of immediate concern in the present discussion.
Among minor changes, the word "person" was substituted for "inhabitant of the United
States," thus apparently validating Mr. Justice Story's construction of the original language.
See note 30 supra; In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488, 492 (1890); but see In re
Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893).
87 Cf. HART & WEcnsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 949 (1953).
88 Note 86 supra.
89 See 18 CONG. REc. 2545 (1887).
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New York to sue a citizen of Oregon in the federal courts of New
York. Senators Wilson and Edmunds denied this, but without
giving very satisfactory explanations. Then Senator Hoar took over
and made the intention unmistakably clear: in essence, the explanation was that the defendant might be sued in the district of
the plaintiff's residence only if he were found there; venue would
be proper in that district, but the plaintiff still had the problem of
getting jurisdiction."
In the debates there was no reference to proceedings by attachment or garnishment. Nevertheless, when it authorized venue in
the district of the plaintiff's residence, Congress removed the only
real obstacle that had existed to the commencement of actions in
the federal courts by such process in diversity cases. While the
senators assumed that suit in the district of the plaintiff's residence
would be possible only if the defendant were found there, the
necessary meaning of the amendment was that suit could be

brought in that district whenever proper personal service could be
obtained, or whenever personal service was not necessary. It is
now perfectly clear, for example, that in a diversity case venue is
proper in the district of the plaintiff's residence, although the defendant is not found and served within that district, if proper
personal service is possible outside the district, or constructive
service can be had under a state nonresident-motorist statute. 91
Hence, if personal service on the defendant is not necessary in actions quasi in rem, the plaintiff should now be able to proceed by
attachment or garnishment in the district of his residence, if he
can find property of the nonresident defendant there; and there
has never been any good reason why personal service in such actions

should be required in the federal courts, when it is not required in
the state courts.
It was not long before the substance of this argument was advanced by an attaching plaintiff in a circuit court, only to be rejected.9 2 The opinion is a careful one, considering the venue
statute of 1887 in relation to the Conformity Act9 3 and even taking
note of the Supreme Court's recognition, in Pennoyer v. Neff, of
the power of the states to proceed against the property of non9Oid. at 2544-45 (1887).
91 Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946); cf. Olberding v. Illinois
Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
92 Harland v. United Lines Tel. Co., 40 Fed. 308 (C.C.D. Conn. 1889).
93 At this time incorporated in the Revised Statutes as §§ 914 and 915.
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residents without personal service. One gets the impression that
the court was almost persuaded; but the day was carried for the
defendant, and for perpetuation of the anomaly, by the old cases,
decided prior to the venue amendment of 1887. The old cases
spoke in terms of jurisdiction, and of the necessity of personal
service. It is not surprising, though it is regrettable, that the
circuit court in the end held that "The statute of March 3, 1887,
introduced no new principle which obviated the necessity of personal service." 94 Indeed, it did not; yet the necessity for such
service had been predicated solely upon the terms of the original
venue statute, and upon the doubts and fears of Mr. Justice Story
concerning the nature and effect of judgments in attachment and
garnishment.9 5
In Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read9" the Supreme Court also turned
a deaf ear to the argument that the change effected in the venue

requirements by the act of 1887 should lead to a modification of
the rule as to proceedings by attachment and garnishment. The
argument was presented clearly enough, but Mr. Justice Day,
citing the old cases, responded only:
"But we are of the opinion that this amendment to the
statute was not intended to do away with the settled rule that,
in order to issue an attachment, the defendant must be subject
to personal service or voluntarily appear in the action. If
Congress had intended any such radical change, it would have
been easy to have made provision for that purpose, and doubtless a method of service by publication in such cases would
have been provided. We think the rule has not been changed;
that an attachment is still but an incident to a suit, and that,
unless jurisdiction can be obtained over the 97defendant, his
estate cannot be attached in a Federal court.

The reader will judge for himself how "radical" the suggested
change would have been. As for the mode of constructive service,
9440 Fed. at 312.
95 In 1909 the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, reaffirmed
(citing the old cases) that in the federal courts attachment is but an incident to a suit, and
unless the court has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant the attachment must
fall. Laborde v. Ubarri, 214 U.S. 173, 174 (1909). Once again the statement appears clearly
to have been dictum. See id. at 174-75. The act of 1887 was not referred to, but its
innovations probably had no bearing since the case arose on writ of error to the District
Court for Puerto Rico.
96 229 U.S. 31 (1913).
97 Id. at 38.
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Congress had taken care of that by adopting the state procedures,
and there was no suggestion that the notice to the defendant in the
instant case was either inadequate or unauthorized by the state law.
Prior to the Conformity Act, it could be maintained with a
degree of plausibility that Congress had not authorized the use in
the federal courts of state provisions for foreign attachment and
garnishment. Prior to the act of 1887 it could be maintained, at
least with respect to inhabitants of the United States, that attachment proceedings brought in the district of the plaintiff's residence,
without personal service on the defendant within the district, were
objectionable because the venue was improper. Prior to Pennoyer
v. Neff it was possible to regard attachment and garnishment with
distrust because of the disposition of the ignorant, and the power
of the states, to regard the judgment as valid in personam. But
when the Big Vein case was decided none of these things was possible with respect to a diversity case commenced by the plaintiff in
the district of his residence, and the Court would have appeared in
a better light if it had given the question more than superficial
consideration instead of perpetuating the unfounded and unique
disability of the federal courts.
III.

JURISDICTION ON REMOVAL AND IN ADMIRALTY

Section 12 of the first Judiciary Act, after providing for the removal of certain actions commenced in state courts, continued:
"And any attachment of the goods or estate of the defendant
by the original process, shall hold the goods or estate so attached, to answer the final judgment in the same manner as by
the laws of such state they would have been holden to answer
final judgment, had it been rendered by the court in which the
suit commenced."98
In Clark v. Wells9 9 the Supreme Court unanimously held that
where an action is commenced by attachment in a state court
against a nonresident, without personal service or appearance, and
is removed, the federal court has jurisdiction to proceed to judgment against the property attached precisely as if the case had re981 Stat.'73, 79-80 (1789).
99 203 U.S. 164 (1906).
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mained in the state court. 00 Indeed, such jurisdiction on removal
has not been doubted in modern times.1 1
On any rational basis, the recognition of jurisdiction quasi in
rem upon removal must be regarded as dealing a death blow to the
notion that there is no such jurisdiction in cases originating in the
federal courts. The two propositions are wholly incompatible, and
one of them must fall. As a matter of abstract logic it might be
argued that the removal cases may be the ones in the wrong; but
the infirmities of the doctrine that an action cannot be commenced
in the district courts by attachment or garnishment lead irresistibly
to the conclusion that the removal cases are right and that the proposition as to original jurisdiction cannot stand.
Since 1887 the privilege of removal has been restricted to cases
"of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction."' 1 2 If the circuit court would not have had jurisdiction of the action in Clark v. Wells 0 3 had it been filed originally
in that court, how could it have jurisdiction on removal? Attempts
have been made to rationalize the incongruity on two grounds: (1)
Congress expressly sanctioned the removal of actions begun by
100 Two minor aspects of the case are worthy of note: (1) After removal, an order for
publication according to state law issued from the circuit court. The Court brushed aside
objections to this form of notice with the statement that no further notice was necessary;
the defendant's removal of the case showed that he knew of it. Id. at 172. (2) The
judgment of the court appeared on its face to be one in personam; the Supreme Court
modified it so as to make it collectible only from the attached property. Id. at 173. Thus
the Court dealt easily with two objections which had figured large in the discussion of
original jurisdiction quasi in rem.
101 Under § 12 of the first Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 79 (1789), the defendant was required
to file his petition for removal "at the time of entering his appearance in such state court,"
and to "offer good and sufficient surety for ... his there appearing and entering special
bail in the cause, if special bail was originally requisite therein .. " Hence it might be
argued that, especially in attachment and garnishment cases, there could not be removal
without a general appearance. Cf. Campbell v. Morris, 3 Harr. & McHen. 535 (Md. 1797);
Pollard and Pickett v. Dwight, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 421, 428-29 (1808); Sayles v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 2 Curt. 212, 213 (C.C.R.I. 1854); Bushnell v. Kennedy, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
387, 393 (1869). But the removal procedure was amended, 18 Stat. (Pt. 3) 470, 471 (1875),
24 Stat. 552, 553-54 (1887), 25 Stat. 433, 435 (1888), so that the petition might be filed "at
the time, or any time before the defendant is required by the laws of the State . . . to
answer or plead to the declaration or complaint .. " The provision as to special bail
was retained, 25 Stat. 435 (1888). Whether the changes effected by the amendments were
significant or not, the earlier cases were disapproved, in so far as they treated a mere
petition for removal as a waiver of the objection to jurisdiction over the person, Goldey
v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 522 et seq. (1895); Wabash Western Ry. v. Brown, 164 U.S.
271 (1896). In Clark v. Wells, note 99 supra, the Court made it dear, though without
referring to the provision as to special bail, that there was no distinction between personal
actions and actions quasi in rem; the petition for removal was not a waiver of objections
to jurisdiction over the person in either case. The reference to special bail does not appear
in the modern removal statutes. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446, 1450 (1958).
102 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (1958). See 24 Stat. 552 (1887), 25 Stat. 433 (1888); HART &
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FmA.L SYSTEM 1010 (1953).
103 The current provision is to be found at 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1958).
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attachment or garnishment when it provided, from the first
Judiciary Act onward, 10 4 for the preservation of attachments obtained in the state court; and (2) the jurisdiction of the federal
courts on removal is "derivative," so that federal jurisdiction of the
cause is sustained by the undoubted jurisdiction of the state
courts. 10 , These explanations are quite inadequate.
Congress also expressly authorized the use of state attachment
procedures in original cases: at first in general terms, 06 and later
in terms no less specific than those used with reference to removal.' 07 With respect to original jurisdiction the congressional
language was given a narrow construction to conform to the judicial
doctrine that there could be no jurisdiction over property in the
absence of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. With precisely equal justification, or lack of it, the reference to attachments
acquired in the state court might have been construed as limited
to cases in which personal jurisdiction had been, or was later, perfected. Whatever may have been the foundation for the doctrine
that jurisdiction did not exist in original cases, cases removed from
the state courts necessarily presented the same problem, so far as
the necessity for personal jurisdiction was concerned. 08
The jurisdiction of the district court on removal is, indeed,
derivative. This means that where a state court lacks jurisdiction
of the subject matter, or of the parties, the district court acquires
none on removal. 10 9 It does not mean that the district court on
removal has jurisdiction merely because the state court was competent. Any such notion renders meaningless the plain language
of the removal statute, restricting removal to cases "of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." 10
104 Note, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 103, 105, 106 (1948); Note, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 448, 450-51
(1940) (semble); Note, 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 361, 361-62 (1940). Cf. Note, 18 N.C.L. REv. 51,
54, 55 (1939), where, although the argument based on express statutory sanction is noted,
the incongruity of the distinction between original and removed cases is recognized.
105 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrIcE 1534, 1539 (2d ed. 1955).
100 1 Stat. 93 (1789).
107 17 Stat. 196 (1872).
108 In retrospect, it must be conceded that there was one difference in favor of jurisdiction on removal: the very filing of the removal petition demonstrated that the defendant had actual notice of the proceedings. Cf. Clark v. Wells, 203 U.S. 164, 172 (1906), note
100 supra. But, while the problem of notice had been one of the concerns of Mr. Justice
Story and other architects of the no-jurisdiction doctrine, they at no time indicated a willingness to settle for actual or other reasonable notice, but insisted on personal service or
general appearance as indispensable. See Part I supra.
109 Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). See
Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943), and cases there cited.
110 See note 102 supra.
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There is one good reason, and only one, why the district court
should be able to proceed to judgment in an attachment case on
removal when it would be unable to do so if the same case had been
filed originally in the district court: the objection to venue which
the defendant would have been able to assert under the Judiciary
Act of 1789, and may still assert with respect to certain actions, is
never available in removal cases. Since 1923 it has been clear that
the general venue statutes do not apply to cases removed from
state courts, and that the proper venue on removal is the district
court for the district "embracing the place where such action is
pending."'11 Assume an action commenced in the Southern District of N~w York by attachment against a resident of the Southern
District of California. Under the original venue provisions the
defendant would have been entitled to dismissal on the ground
that the action was brought in a district of which he was not an
inhabitant, and in which he was not found. But if the same action
were brought originally in a state court in New York City, and
removed to the District Court for the Southern District, the venue
would be unobjectionable. Similarly, if such an action were begun today in the district court, jurisdiction not being founded
solely on diversity, the defendant could procure dismissal-or transfer"12-on the ground that the only proper venue was the district of
his residence; but if the same action were filed in a state court and
removed, the venue objection would disappear. And today, even
if the action were filed originally in the district court for the
Southern District of New York, there could be no objection to the
venue if jurisdiction were founded solely on diversity of citizenship. The truth is that it has been the difficulty of justifying the
venue, rather than the lack of in personam jurisdiction, that has
always been the real impediment to attachment and garnishment
in the federal courts.
These considerations seem abundantly sufficient to establish
that there is no lack of jurisdiction in the federal courts to proceed
by attachment and garnishment without personal service; but
there is more. In Rorick v. Devon Syndicate" 3 the Court went
well beyond Clark v. Wells, holding that after removal, and still
without personal jurisdiction of the defendant, the district court
could issue a further order of attachment or garnishment against
11128 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (1958). See Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 260 U.S. 653 (1923),
overruling earlier decisions which had treated the venue provisions as jurisdictional.
112 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a) (1958).
113 307 U.S. 299 (1939).
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other property of the same defendant. The case is significant because in it, for the first time, the Court adopted a skeptical attitude
toward the precedents denying jurisdiction quasi in rem in original
cases, and strongly intimated that the practice on removal might
overthrow the old doctrine. In removal cases the Court, said Mr.
Justice Douglas, "has not adhered rigorously to the philosophy
underlying the antecedents of the Big Vein Coal Company case." 114
Here there is no gainsaying the fact that the district court was authorized, by process issuing from that court in conformity to state
law, to acquire jurisdiction over the property of a foreign corporation without personal service. True, the Court spoke of the lien
originally acquired by the state court attachment as being "extended by the federal court to other property of the same defendant.""" And there was a half-hearted effort to reconcile the
decision with precedent:
"This holding can be brought within the rule of the Big
Vein Coal Company case, supra, if that decision is narrowly
limited. For in one sense it can be said that attachment or
garnishment is here used only as an 'auxiliary remedy.' Id.,
p. 37. The garnishment effected [after removal] ... would
merely extend the proceedings in rem to reach other property
of the same defendant." 1 6
But this is surely the disingenuousness of a Court reluctant to overrule its former decisions unless such a course is absolutely required
for adjudication of the case before it. The precedents on original
jurisdiction had tolerated attachment and garnishment as "auxiliary remedies" solely in the sense of their being auxiliary to actions in personam:
"... [T]he principle.., has been laid down more than once
by this court, that in the courts of the United States 'attachment is but an incident to a suit, and unless the suit can be
maintained the attachment must fall.' Ex parte Railway Co.,
103 U.S. 794, 796. 'Unless the suit can be maintained' means,
of course, unless the court has jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.""17
The ruling in the Rorick case was not dictum, and the Court was
unanimous.
114Id. at M1I.
115 Id. at 812.
"O0ld. at 313.
17 Laborde v. Ubarri, 214 U.S. 173, 174 (1909) (per Holmes, J.).
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Also inconsistent with the doctrine that the federal courts have
no original jurisdiction in attachment and garnishment without
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant is the fact that those
courts have from the beginning exercised such jurisdiction in
admiralty cases. 118 The practice in admiralty appears to have been
challenged for the first time in a district court in 1802, and the
court, relying on the process act 19 and on Clarke's Praxis,120 held
clearly that "attachments against the goods or debts of absent per1
sons may issue out of this court of admiralty."''
A degree of uncertainty as to the propriety of the practice was
injected when Mr. Justice Washington, on circuit, unnecessarily
held that section 11 of the Judiciary Act was applicable to admiralty
cases. 122 As an incident to a prize proceeding in the circuit court
for the district of Rhode Island, a warrant had issued for the arrest
of a resident of Pennsylvania, pursuant to which the arrest was
made in that state. In support of the judgment discharging the
petitioner it would have been sufficient to say, as Mr. Justice Washington did, that on general principles the process of the circuit
court for the district of Rhode Island was limited to that district,
and that "the person or thing against whom or which the court
1' 23
proceeds, [must] be within the local jurisdiction of such court.'

But Mr. Justice Washington added that section 11 of the Judiciary
Act was applicable,' 24 thus laying the foundation for later suggestions that admiralty could not proceed originally by attachment
and garnishment.
118 See ADvm. R. 2, 5; cf. Rules 2 and 4 of the original Admiralty Rules, 3 How. ix, x
(2d ed., Rapalje); 3 U.S. CoMP. STAT. 2695 (1916). The effective date of the original rules
seems to have been September 1, 1845. Compare Rule 47, 3 How. xix, with Cushing v.
Laird, 6 Fed. Cas. 1017, 1021 (No. 3508) (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1870).
119 "That the forms of writs, executions and other process . . . and the forms and
modes of proceeding in suits ... of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction [shall be] according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to . . . courts of admiralty . . . as
contradistinguished from courts of common law." 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792). By the original
process act, such matters were to be determined "according to the course of the civil law."
1 Stat. 93, 94 (1789).
120 "Francis Clerke was registrar of the court of arches during the reign of Queen
Elizabeth. His work, 'Praxis Supremae Curiae Admiralitatis' was first printed in 1679. It
was in Latin. A fifth edition, in Latin, was published in 1791. This was a very correct
edition, and is the one from which the translation by Mr. Hall, which is the Baltimore
edition of 1809, was made." Cushing v. Laird, 6 Fed. Cas. 1017, 1022 (No. 3508) (D.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1870) (per Blatchford, J.).
121 Bouysson v. Miller, 3 Fed. Cas. 1021, 1022 (No. 1709) (D.C.S.C. 1802).
122 Ex parte Graham, 10 Fed. Cas. 911 (No. 5657) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818).
12 Id. at 913.
124 "Prize proceeding against an inhabitant of the United States, is unquestionably a
civil suit; and if it be against the person, instead of the thing, the jurisdiction is excluded,
unless it be instituted in the court of the district whereof he is an inhabitant, or is found
at the time of serving the process." Ibid.
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Four years prior to his decision in Picquet v. Swan

25

Mr.

Justice Story, on circuit, fully recognized in a dictum the propriety
of attachment and garnishment in admiralty without personal
jurisdiction:
"I accede to the position, that, in general, in cases of maritime torts, a court of admiralty will sustain jurisdiction, where
either the person, or his property, is within the territory. It
is not even confined to the mere offending thing; it spreads its
arms over the tangible, as well as incorporeal property of the
offending party, to enable it to afford an adequate remedy.
The admiralty may therefore arrest the person, or the propin action, of the
erty, or, by a foreign attachment, the choses
12
offending party, to answer ex delicto."'

1

There is here no hint of the suspicion and distrust with which the
learned Justice regarded foreign attachment in civil cases four years
later-no concern with the attachment of property of trivial value,
no concern with notice to the defendant, and no insistence on personal service or general appearance.
The question came before the Supreme Court in 1825 in Manro
v. Almeida,127 and the propriety of proceeding by foreign attachment was solidly affirmed on the ground that such had been the
practice in the civil law, and formerly in the English admiralty
courts, and likewise in the vice-admiralty courts and in the district
of South Carolina. 128 But the former practice was not the sole
basis for the decision; in our own courts the procedure had been in
use "perhaps not so generally as to sanction our sustaining it altogether on authority, were we not of opinion, that it has the
129 If
highest sanction also, as well in principle as convenience."'
the practice was sanctioned by principle and convenience in admiralty, why not in civil cases as well? 30
In Clark v. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co.131 Mr. Justice
Story said:
125 Note 26 supra.
120 The Invincible, 13 Fed. Cas. 72, 76 (No. 7054) (C.C.D. Mass. 1814).
127 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 478 (1825).
128 The authority of the case is somewhat weakened by the fact that the defendant
arguably made a technical personal appearance: without entering bail, he demurred to
the libel under protest on the ground that the attachment prayed for could not issue. Id.
at 475, 478, 484, 485, 494.
121) Id. at 490.
130 Taney was counsel for the defendant, and argued that, since a civil suit by attach-

ment could not be maintained, neither could the libel. Id. at 481. But it was Taney who
dissented vigorously against the denial of jurisdiction in Toland v. Sprague. See note 63
supra.

1 1 1 Story 531 (C.C.D.R.I. 1841).
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"Neither has it been doubted, that the process of attachment
well lies in an admiralty suit against the property of private
persons, whose property is found within the District, although
their persons may not be found therein, as well to enforce their
appearance to the suit, as to apply it in satisfaction of the decree
rendered in the suit. Ever since the elaborate examination of
this whole subject, in the case of Manro v. Almeida (10 Wheat.
132
R. 473), this question has been deemed entirely at rest."'
The question was not entirely at rest, however, in the minds of all
the judges. In Wilson v. Pierce33 Judge Hoffman, in a careful
opinion giving full attention to all precedents, held that section 11
of the Judiciary Act prevented suit in admiralty by original process
of attachment or garnishment against an inhabitant of the United
States over whom the court did not have personal jurisdiction.
The decision is highly significant, despite the fact that it was later
overruled.13 4 In a word, the significance lies in the fact that this
obviously able and conscientious judge could find no reason whatever for distinguishing between the power of a district court to
proceed by attachment in admiralty and its power to proceed in
that fashion in civil cases-which is precisely the point made in this
paper, except that, whereas Judge Hoffman concluded that the
established unavailability of that procedure in civil cases required
its denial in admiralty, the argument here is the converse: the undoubted jurisdiction of the courts to proceed by attachment in
admiralty requires recognition of the same jurisdiction in civil
cases.
The case of Manro v. Almeida 3 5 was distinguished on the
ground that there it did not appear that the defendant was "an
inhabitant of the United States"; he was described only as an absconding debtor, who, for all that appeared, might have fled the
country. That case aside, the dominant precedents appeared to be
Picquet v. Swan and Toland v. Sprague. On any analysis the reasoning of Judge Hoffman is at least understandable; on one level
it is unanswerable:
"It may be urged that the jurisdiction and modes of proceeding of the admiralty courts of the United States, rest ex182Id. at 536-37. The sole question for decision was whether attachment would lie
against a foreign corporation, as well as a "private person"; the court held that it would.
Picquet v. Swan, note 26 supra, and Toland v. Sprague, note 52 supra, were not cited.
183 30 Fed. Cas. 150 (No. 17826) (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1852).
184 Atkins v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 85 US. (18 Wall.) 272, 306-07 (1873).
185 Note 127 supra.
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clusively on the grant in the constitution, and the rules furnished by the process act of 1789 and 1792;-that as, by those
acts, the forms of proceeding are required to be according to
the practice of the civil law and the rules and usages of courts
of admiralty, and as the writ of foreign attachment is in accordance with such practice, rules and usages, the prohibition
clause of the judiciary act has no application. But by the same
process act.., the forms of writs and modes of proceeding in
the supreme courts of the states, respectively, were adopted
into the judicial proceedings of the United States, on the
common law side. And in the cases of Picquet v. Swan . . .
and Toland v. Sprague . . . the very point adjudged was,

that though the practice of the state courts authorized the
proceeding by foreign attachment, yet that practice can have
no effect where it contravenes the positive legislation of Congress;-and that the state practice can be followed only where
the court independently of it possesses jurisdiction; the proc-

ess acts not having enlarged the jurisdiction, but only furnished rules for its exercise. The analogous provision, adopting in admiralty and maritime cases the practice of the civil
law, must, it seems to me, receive a similar construction. If
this reasoning be well founded, it follows that the process
act, which prescribed the modes of proceeding in the admiralty cases, conferred no additional jurisdiction on the district
courts, and that, if the prohibition contained in the judiciary
act applies to courts sitting in admiralty cases, the prohibition
was not removed, nor was the jurisdiction enlarged by the
subsequent adoption of the civil law practice and that 'of
courts of admiralty.' "uSO
What Judge Hoffman overlooked was (1) that section 11 of the
Judiciary Act, construed as Mr. Justice Story had construed it,
would have been intolerable as a venue provision in admiralty,
where proceedings against foreigners and others residing abroad
were commonplace; and (2) that in the linguistic structure of the
Judiciary Act it was possible to find justification for not applying
the process-venue provision to admiralty cases. Judge Blatchford
strongly disagreed with Judge Hoffman, in a proceeding against a
13630 Fed. Cas. at 151-52. See also id. at 153. Incidentally, Judge Hoffman made a
point that should have given pause to those who, while accepting attachment in admiralty,
rejected it in civil cases because of concern over notice to the defendant. while the state
statutes presumably allowed ample time for the defendant to appear, in accordance with
the custom of London, there seemed nothing in the federal practice to prevent a default
in admiralty after the short period of time given a defendant, personally served, to plead.
Id. at 155.
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nonresident British subject. 137 His principal reliance was on the
entrenched position of attachment in the traditional admiralty
practice, on the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, and on
the Supreme Court's decision in Manro v. Almeida.138
The Supreme Court dispelled the confusion in Atkins v. Fibre
DisintegratingCo.'139 Its approach was strictly linguistic: if section
11 were construed in the light of other sections of the Judiciary
Act, it appeared that the restrictive clause of that section was not
intended to apply to causes civil and maritime, but only to cases at
law and in equity. Ex parte Graham, 40 so far as it held the contrary, and Wilson v. Pierce'4' were disapproved. 4 '
The final chapter was written in In re Louisville Underwriters.14a The case arose after the 1887 amendment of the venue
provision, 1 44 and the Court had only to hold that the amendment
did not change the principle announced in Atkins v. Fibre DisintegratingCo. But the case is significant because it added to the
rationale of the Atkins case a substantial, as well as a verbalistic,
reason for the inapplicability of the general venue provisions to
admiralty cases:
"Courts of admiralty are established for the settlement of
disputes between persons engaged in commerce and naviga137 "It is sufficient to say, that, as it is not shown that the respondent ever has been
an inhabitant of the United States, the provision cited from the said 11th section does

not apply to this case, even though it should be conceded that this suit is such a civil suit
as is intended by the provision." Cushing v. Laird, 6 Fed. Cas. 1017, 1020 (No. 3508)
(D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1870).
138 Note 127 supra. Smith v. Miln, 22 Fed. Cas. 603 (No. 13081) (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1848),
casts no doubt on the availability of attachment in admiralty; on the contrary, Judge Betts
recognized that "its force and utility is grounded in the high principle that personal obligations may be enforced by justice by preliminary and direct action on property, both

for the purpose of compelling an appearance of the debtor .... and also by the sequestration or transfer of such property to the benefit of those to whom it rightfully belongs,
without other action against or coercion over the person of the debtor." Id. at 605. The

libellant failed solely because of neglect to summon the garnishee properly.

139 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 272 (1873). As in Toland v. Sprague, the Court seems to have
gone to some length to contrive the occasion to consider the "jurisdictional" question.
Unquestionably the defendant had entered a general appearance, sufficient to sustain the
judgment against it in personam. Id. at 298. But because the stipulation for value was
entered into subject to the disposition of a motion to discharge the attached property, the
court took the view that it was necessary to consider the validity of the attachment since,
"If the attachment clause was void for want of jurisdiction in the District Court to issue
it, the seizure of the property was a trespass, and the stipulation a nullity ...." Id. at 299.
But the earlier cases, including Toland v. Sprague, had made it clear that a general
appearance cured any objection to the attachment.
140 Note 122 supra.
141 Note 138 supra.
142 85 US. (18 Wall.) at 306-07.
143 134 U.S. 488 (1890).
144 24 Stat. 552 (1887).
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tion, who, on the one hand, may be absent from their homes
for long periods of time, and, on the other hand, often have
property or credits in other places ....

To compel suitors in

admiralty (when the ship is abroad and cannot be reached by
a libel in rem) to resort to the home of the defendant, and to

prevent them from suing him in any district in which he might
be served with a summons or his goods or credits attached,
would not only often put them to great delay, inconvenience
and expense, but would in many cases amount to a denial of
justice."'145
There can be no basic quarrel with this attitude. It would have
been absurd to read either section 11 of the Judiciary Act or the act
of 1887 as limiting the venue of suits in admiralty, just as it would
be absurd to give the current general venue statutes 46 that effect.
In general it is true now, and has always been true, that there are
no venue statutes applicable to admiralty. "By the ancient and
settled practice of courts of admiralty, a libel in personam may be
maintained for any cause within their jurisdiction, wherever a
monition can be served upon the libelee, or an attachment made of
any personal property or credits of his.. .. ,'147 And the facts of the
Louisville Underwriters case make it abundantly clear that the
objection to proceedings by attachment or garnishment is not one
of jurisdiction, but of venue only. The process agent appointed by
the corporate defendant in the forum state had been personally
served.14s The objection could only be that the defendant was,
by the act of 1887, immune to any proceeding in personam (with
or without attachment) except in the district of which it was an
inhabitant.
Lest there be any misunderstanding, let it be emphasized that
nothing that has been said here should be construed as deprecating
the power of the district courts to proceed by attachment or garnishment in removal cases, or in admiralty cases, in the absence of
personal jurisdiction. That power is well founded in precedent
and reason, and there is no disposition on the part of anyone to
disturb it. The pity is that the courts have treated the question,
145 134 U.S. at 493.
14628 U.S.C. § 1391

(1958).

147 In re Louisville Undenvriters, 134 US. 488, 490 (1890). See 2 BF.NExm'r, ADNURALTY
79 (6th ed. Knauth 1940).
148 There having been no attachment or garnishment, the reference of the Court to
the availability of that process in admiralty was technically dictum. Yet the point was
that if the Court construed the venue statute as applicable to admiralty cases, the result
would be to rule out such process where the defendant was not an inhabitant of the district.
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so far as original civil cases are concerned, as one of jurisdiction
rather than of venue; and that the venue statutes are careless of the
interests of American creditors in certain cases. The passage
quoted above' 49 from the Louisville Underwriters case, emphasizing the convenience and justice of the remedy quasi in rem against
foreigners, exhibits a tendency that is all too common among
members of the bench and bar. Because admiralty cases frequently
involve defendants residing in no judicial district the remedy by
attachment is regarded as necessary and just. But ordinary civil
cases also may involve defendants residing in no judicial district;
yet when the courts considered the availability of attachment in
such cases, they thought not of convenience and justice to the local
plaintiff, but regarded attachment as an alien procedure fraught
with possibilities of injustice to the foreign defendant. If venue
statutes stand in the way of such proceedings there is little the
courts can do to relieve the situation; but where such statutes do
not stand in the way-as in diversity cases under the current Judicial
Code-the courts should abandon the notion that in civil cases they
have "no jurisdiction" to proceed quasi in rem without personal
jurisdiction of the defendant. We would be better off if, instead
of regarding admiralty cases as uniquely different from civil cases
because admiralty is characterized by actions involving foreigners,
we were to treat alike cases that are alike on their facts. As matters
stand, a New York creditor having a nonadmiralty claim against a
resident of France cannot proceed in the federal courts by attachment of the debtor's property in New York; but if the claim is
cognizable in admiralty he may so proceed'1°-and he might do so
even if the defendant were a resident of New Jersey, or of California, although in that event the practical reasons given in Louisville Underwriters for countenancing the procedure in admiralty
would not be present.
No court has ever suggested that Congress lacks power to confer
such quasi in rem jurisdiction on the district courts generally.
The suggestion offered here is that Congress has done so, and that
the Court has failed to recognize the fact. In each of the three
cases considered the jurisdiction was conferred by reference: to
state law with respect to original jurisdiction and jurisdiction on
removal, and to the principles and usages of admiralty courts with
respect to that head of jurisdiction. In two of the three instances
See text at note 145 supra.
150 For a modem instance of the use of attachment in admiralty, see Swift & Co. v.
149

Compania Caribe, 839 U.S. 684 (1950).
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the courts have taken the reference at face value. Only with
respect to original jurisdiction of civil cases have they held that
the grant of jurisdiction is circumscribed by other legislation; and,
while that holding is justified where the other legislation makes
the venue improper, the courts have gone far beyond this defensible
position, and created the false notion that the reason for the unavailability of attachment is jurisdictional.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The conclusion seems inescapable that the Advisory Committee, in proposing Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
did not intend to bring about any change in existing law. Although the language of the rule itself appears to authorize the use
of state provisions for attachment "at the commencement" of an

action so as to acquire jurisdiction quasi in rem, the Notes of the
Advisory Committee stated: "This rule adopts the existing federal
law, except that it specifies the applicable state law to be that of the
time when the remedy is sought."''I
Thus nothing of substance
was added to what had been given by the process act of 1789152 and
the Conformity Act of 1872,153 as construed. But there can be no
justification for the view of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit

54

that to construe the rule as authorizing attachment and

garnishment without jurisdiction of the person of the defendant
would have brought about a conflict with the provision of Rule 82,
that "These rules shall not be construed to extend... the jurisdiction of the district courts. .. ." As we have seen, the only sense in

which it can possibly be maintained that the unavailability of attachment and garnishment is "jurisdictional" is that, according to
the interpretations placed by the courts on the process act and the
Conformity Act, Congress has not chosen to invest the district
courts with such jurisdiction. But Rule 64 is the successor to the
relevant provisions of those acts. The enabling act provided:
"That the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power
to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United
States ...the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and
the practice and procedure in civil actions at law ... ,,15 The sub-

ject covered by the process act was "the forms of writs and execu151 See further Note, 34 CORNF.LL L.Q. 103, 107 et seq. (1948).
152 1 Stat. 93 (1789).
153 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872).
1G4 Davis v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 139 F.2d 624, 626 (8th Cir. 1944).
15 48 Stat. 1064 (1934); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
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tions . . . and modes of process"; 156 the subject covered by the

Conformity Act was "the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes
of proceeding.' 157 It was by virtue of the authority conferred on
the district courts by those two acts that jurisdiction in attachment
58
and garnishment was upheld upon removal and in admiralty.
The very authority which Congress exercised in passing those acts
was delegated to the Court by the enabling act. It is only because
Congress is supposed not to have exercised its authority to approve
the commencement of civil actions by attachment and garnishment
that the practice has been disapproved. Hence if the Court, exercising the authority delegated to it by Congress, promulgates a
rule authorizing the practice, the defect is ipso facto rectified, there
is no longer a reason for objecting to the practice, and there is
certainly no increment to the "jurisdiction" of the district courts.
There has only been an exercise of the delegated power to "prescribe.., the forms of process." And the rule, of course, does not
become effective without congressional concurrence.
Any remaining doubt as to the validity of a rule authorizing
the commencement of civil actions by attachment or garnishment
without personal service should be dissipated by the Court's decision in Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree159 If Rule 4 (f),
authorizing the personal process of the district court to be served
anywhere within the state, instead of merely within the district,
was not an extension of the jurisdiction of those courts, it can
hardly be supposed that the hypothetical rule under discussion
would be so considered.
"It is true that the service of summons is the procedure by
which a court having venue and jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the
party served. But it is evident that Rule 4 (f) and Rule 82
must be construed together, and that the Advisory Committee,
in doing so, has treated Rule 82 as referring to venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the district courts as defined
by the statutes, §§51 and 52 of the Judicial Code in particular,
rather than the means of bringing the defendant before the
court already having venue and jurisdiction of the subject
matter. Rule 4 (f) does not enlarge or diminish the venue of
156 1 Stat. 93 (1789).

157 17 Stat. 197 (§ 5) (1872); and § 6, ibid., dealt expressly with "attachment or other
process."

158 See Part III supra.
159 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
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the district court, or its power to decide the issues in the suit,
which is jurisdiction of the subject matter.... Rule 4 (f) serves
only to implement the jurisdiction over the subject matter
which Congress has conferred, by providing a procedure by
which the defendant may be brought into court at the place
where Congress has declared that the suit may be maintained." 6 0
The same would be true of a rule unambiguously authorizing the
commencement of an action by attachment or garnishment. In
the Davis case the court had jurisdiction of the "subject matter"
by virtue of diversity of citizenship, the requisite amount being in
controversy. Venue was proper in the district of the plaintiff's
residence. The rule allowing attachment or garnishment would
merely provide a procedure for requiring the defendant to appear
and defend, or, in the alternative, for subjecting the defendant's
property, within the geographical limits of the district, to the
plaintiff's claim. 161
The former Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure
in 1955 recommended an amendment of the rules designed to authorize proceedings quasi in rem in accordance with state law.162
160 Id. at 444-45.
161 Doubts, which seem clearly unfounded, have been expressed as to the propriety
of such a use of the rule-making power. Note, 28 So. CAL. L. REv. 188, 193 (1955); but
cf. Note, 34 CoRN.r L.Q. 103, 107 et seq. (1948); 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 361, 363 (1940).
162 Report of Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United
States District Courts 10, 11-14 (1955). The proposal was to amend Rule 4(e) to read as
follows (new matter in italics):
"(e) SAME: OnTE SERVIcE. Whenever a statute of the United States or any of
these rules or an order of court provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or
of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within
the state, service shall be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed
by the statute, rule, or order. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in
which the district court is held provides for notice to such a party to appear and
respond or to defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment of his
property located within the state, or for service of a summons, notice, or order in lieu
of summons upon a party not an inhabitantof or found within the state, it shall also
be sufficient if service is made or the party is brought before the court under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribedin the state statute or rule."

In view of the restrictive attitude adopted in the past, it may be doubted whether
the proposed amendment is adequate to accomplish the clear purpose of the Advisory
Committee. The amended rule provides a mode of serving, or notifying, the nonresident
defendant; but in the same way, by reference to state procedure, so did the Conformity
Act, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872). It would seem preferable to make dear, perhaps by amendment of Rule 64, that the purpose is to authorize the district courts to proceed quasi in
rem without personal service on the defendant.
I cannot agree with Professor Blume, Actions Quasi in Rem Under Section 1655, 28
US.C., 50 MicH. L. REv. 1, 9 (1951), that the appropriate solution is an amendment of

section 1655 of the Judicial Code. That section has a wholly different purpose, relating to
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The Court has not acted on the proposal, and presumably will not
do so unless it is renewed by the new Advisory Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference. Professor
Moore opposed the proposed amendment: "It is unwise to increase
the number of diversity cases that can be brought originally in the
district courts by providing for quasi in rem jurisdiction as the
amendment to Rule 4 (e) purposes. Practicalities do not justify
this enlargement.' 163
If there were a proposal to enlarge the diversity jurisdiction of
the district courts this writer would not be among its supporters.
But the proposed amendment has nothing directly to do with
diversity jurisdiction. It would simply allow proceedings quasi in
rem according to state law where the court has jurisdiction by
reason of diversity or otherwise, and where the venue is proper.
It happens that in the circumstances the greatest effect would be
to allow diversity cases to be filed originally (and effectively) in the
district court where that is not now possible. That, however, is no
reason why the problem should be beclouded by invoking the passions that surround the basic issue as to diversity jurisdiction. The
only cases that would be affected are cases now within the jurisdiction of the district courts, which cannot be effectively brought
pre-existing liens and claims. The problems of attachment and garnishment have historically been dealt with in Rules 4 and 64 and their statutory predecessors.
A similar problem exists as to the power of the district court to enter judgment quasi
in rem under § 1655 itself, in the absence of personal jurisdiction. See Report of Proposed
Amendments, supra, at 18; Blume, supra, at 4-5; FED. R. Civ. P. 70; Carney v. Commonwealth Oil & Gas Co., 5 F. Supp. 304 (D. Kan. 1933); Dan Cohen Realty Co. v. National
Savings & Trust Co., 125 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1942). Section 1655 makes venue proper in
the district where the property is located, and makes provision for constructive service on
absent defendants. When the absent defendant does not appear the district court should
have authority to proceed in rem, at least if such procedure is authorized by state law.
The existence of this authority is further demonstration of the anomalous character of
the denial of in rem authority in attachment and garnishment cases.
163 Report of Proposed Amendments, supra note 162, at 7.
An objection even more pointedly invoking attitudes of hostility toward the diversity jurisdiction might be that, in a case such as Davis v. Ensign Bickford Co., to change
the rules so as to give the Arkansas plaintiff the option to sue in a federal court of his
home state would be out of harmony with the presumed purpose of the diversity jurisdiction, to protect nonresidents against the hypothetical prejudice of state tribunals. A
partial answer is: (1) The proposed change is not limited to diversity cases, though they
would be the ones most affected as matters stand, but would permit proceedings quasi in
rem in any case in which the venue is proper under existing or future venue statutes.
(2) If it is out of harmony with the underlying purpose of the diversity jurisdiction to
give the plaintiff the choice of a federal forum in his home state, it is nevertheless a fact
that plaintiffs in diversity cases have enjoyed that choice since the Judiciary Act of 1789,
see note 10 supra, and that the privilege was pointedly and expressly confirmed by the
venue statute of 1887, note 84 supra. So long as the plaintiff in diversity cases enjoys this
privilege in general, it is anomalous to withhold it from him in actions quasi in rem.
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there because the strange history of judicial decision that has been
recounted says that there is no means of bringing the defendant
before the court. They are cases which the plaintiff may bring in
a state court, and which the defendant may then remove to a
federal court. It is not easy to understand why one should be concerned over the number of diversity cases "brought originally" in
the district courts on account of diversity rather than over the total
number of such cases, original and removed.
As for "practicalities": It is no doubt true that, in general, the
plaintiff is not deprived of his remedy by the inability to proceed
by attachment or garnishment in the federal court. Thus in the
Davis case the plaintiff might have filed his action in the state
courts of Arkansas and obtained the relief sought-and in the federal court at that, had the defendant exercised its right of removal.
Yet if the plaintiff has reasons for preferring the federal forum, why
should it be denied him when he proceeds by attachment, when
he could resort to it if he could serve the defendant personally?
Moreover, the alternative of attachment in the state courts is available only in cases of concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction. An
action for patent or copyright infringement, for example, may be
brought only in a federal court.16 4 It may be that the current
venue statutes would prevent action by attachment in such cases
even if the rules were amended as suggested; 16 5 yet why should not
the anomalous disability to proceed by attachment or garnishment
be rectified in anticipation of a revision of the venue statutes? Why
should not a trustee in bankruptcy, liquidating the assets of the
bankrupt's estate, be allowed to proceed by attachment? 6 6 And
why should the United States be required to resort to a state court
167
when it locates property of its nonresident debtor in this country?
A major practical reason for rectifying the defect is that Rule
64, like its statutory predecessors, is a well-camouflaged trap for
the unwary. By its terms it seems to invite litigants to avail themselves of state remedies by attachment and garnishment in the
federal courts; but it turns out to be a delusion and a snare. We
have seen that, although the unavailability of such remedies was
164

28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1958).

165 See 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (1958).

166 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1958); Nazro v. Cragin, supra note 69.
167 See 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1958); United States v. Brooks, 184 Fed. 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y.
1910) (vacating attachment of property of residents of England, in a case arising out of
violation of the customs laws, "though it must be conceded that the inability of the
United States to obtain relief in the courts of its own creation presents an anomalous

situation').
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declared by the Supreme Court as long ago as 1818,168 plaintiffs
have repeatedly resorted to the federal courts by way of attachment
and garnishment, only to be turned away. The wasted effort and
expense involved in such abortive efforts is bad enough in itself;
but the consequences may be more serious. If the attachment is
vacated the plaintiff loses the lien provided by state law, which may
be a very serious consequence indeed. 16 9 And, although statutes of
limitation are normally tolled while the defendant is beyond the
reach of personal service, it is not inconceivable that in some situations the plaintiff may lose his remedy by reason of the lapse of
time between his filing in the federal court and his refiling in the
state court. 70
The anomalous defect of "jurisdiction" may produce absurd
results in cases in which the plaintiff pursues both a maritime and
a civil cause of action, or in which it is unclear whether the case is
properly cognizable by virtue of diversity or by virtue of the admiralty jurisdiction. Thus in James Richardson& Sons v. Conners
Marine Co.'

17

1

a shipper sued a marine carrier for damage and

shortage suffered by a cargo of wheat which, when it could not be
unloaded according to plan, remained in storage aboard the vessel.
It was difficult if not impossible to determine whether the damage
and loss had occurred during the period of transportation or that
of storage, and the defendant contended that, so far as the claim
related to the period of storage, it was not within the admiralty
jurisdiction. Judge Clark, for the Court of Appeals, treated the
storage as an incident of the transportation, so that the entire claim
was within the admiralty jurisdiction; but, very sensibly, he noted
that if the result were otherwise, it would make no difference
because the district court had jurisdiction by virtue of diversity of
citizenship, and so could dispose of the whole case though the
claim were partly nonmaritime. Suppose this action had been
commenced by foreign attachment, without personal jurisdiction
of the defendant. According to existing law the attachment would
be good in admiralty, but not in the civil case; and the difficulty of
separating the maritime from the nonmaritime claim might prevent any resort to the attached property at all. At the least, the
168 Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300 (1818).
169 Cf. Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934).
170 Cf. Toland v. Sprague, note 168 supra.
171 141 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1944).
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unavailability of the remedy in civil actions would have obstructed
12
the convenient and sensible solution reached by Judge Clark. 7
The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference has requested that the Advisory Committee
on Admiralty Rules give priority to a study of the feasibility of
uniting the civil and the admiralty practices under a single set of
rules of procedure. If such a unification should prove feasible, it
would be necessary, of course, to preserve the practice of foreign
attachment and garnishment for admiralty cases. To do that, and
in the same body of rules to preserve the provisions which have
been held inadequate to authorize the practice in civil actions,
would be to perpetuate the anomaly and give it outright approval
-and that is something no legislative and no rule-making body has
yet done. Thus far the statutes and the rules have apparently
authorized the practice; the worst that can be said of them is that,
strictly construed, they have given insufficiently clear authorization.
Only the courts have indicated disapproval of the practice, and
that disapproval, early in the nineteenth century, was based on
misapprehension and confusion. At all times the courts have
acknowledged the power of Congress to provide for attachment
and garnishment in civil cases without personal jurisdiction, and
that power has now been delegated by Congress to the Court.
Failure to correct the defect through the exercise of the rule-making
power, in the circumstances, would amount to a deliberate decision
that such proceedings in the federal courts are positively undesirable-a decision that it would be difficult indeed to justify.
Finally, if a recent decision by a district court is correct, a
diversity action may be commenced in a district court by attachment or garnishment without personal jurisdiction of the defendant; the restriction imposed by the precedents means only that the
court cannot proceed to judgment against the attached property
until personal jurisdiction is perfected."7 3 The defendant, though

a resident of New York, had extensive business and social interests
in California; an alias summons was outstanding. Since the court
had jurisdiction because of diversity, and since venue was proper in
the district of the plaintiff's residence, the court saw no reason why
it should not hold the credits in the hands of the garnishees to
answer the judgment that might ultimately be rendered, because
172 See also Branic v. Wheeling Steel Corp., 152 F.2d 887 (Sd Cir. 1946).

173 Hearst v. Hearst, 15 F.R.D. 258 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
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"in all likelihood defendant can and will be personally served with
process issuing from this court.' 1 74 A number of observations are
suggested. First, it is apparent that, if this is a proper limitation
of the restrictive precedents, the number of diversity cases that
may be originally filed in the district courts will not be appreciably
enlarged by a rule such as that proposed by the Advisory Committee in 1955. Original actions seeking attachment or garnishment
may properly be filed now, and will remain on the docket so long
as the possibility of personal service can be kept alive by the issuance of alias summons.1 75 Second, this qualification of the restric-

tive doctrine would appear, on its face, to introduce a number of
uncertainties and perplexities into federal practice. How long is
the attached property to be tied up? Just how good is the attachment? Is it clearly within the jurisdiction of the court, or is the
court exercising merely some sort of inchoate jurisdiction? Is the
lien entitled to recognition in other courts? 1 76 How is the case to

be removed from the docket? If the defendant appears specially
and moves to quash, how is the court to determine the likelihood
that he will be found and served in California in the future?
Actually, the decision is neither so novel nor so troublesome
as it seems. At common law, as even Mr. Justice Story recognized,
process of attachment, or distringas, could issue against the estate
of a defendant; the only disability suffered by the common-law
court was that it could not, in the absence of appearance, proceed
to judgment against the property. 77 The district court in California was doing no more than common-law courts have always
been able to do, even without the aid of the custom of London or
the principles and usages of the civil law. There should, then, be
no doubt as to the jurisdiction of the court to attach the property,
nor as to the validity of the attachment lien. The question remains:
how is the case to be removed from the docket? Must we once again
resort to the process of outlawry? It seems simpler to amend the
rules and allow the court to proceed to judgment against the property by default if the defendant does not appear.
So much for the "practicalities." To them may be added the
observation that, as nature abhors a vacuum, so may the legal
mind deplore a pointless deficiency in the authority of the federal
courts, brought about solely by faulty analysis.
174 Id. at 260. The motion to quash was made by the garnishees. See text at note 82
supTa.

175 Cf. FED. R. Crv. P. 4 (a).
176 Cf. Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, note 169 supra.
177

See note 86 supra.
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Attachment and garnishment have their harsh aspects. A resident of New York may own property worth somewhat more than
$10,000 in California. The property is attached in an action against
him on a claim, which he believes to be unfounded, for $50,000.
He faces the dilemma that, if he defaults, he will certainly lose the
property, while if he appears and defends he will subject himself
to the possibility of a much greater personal liability in an inconvenient and perhaps unfriendly forum. There is a way of ameliorating this condition and the injustice inherent in it, and the rules
should also be amended to make it dearly available. The defendant may be permitted to make a limited appearance for the purpose
of defending his interest in the property by contesting the merits
of the claim, without being subjected personally to the jurisdiction
of the court for any purpose.178 This humanitarian doctrine has
been opposed by some commentators, 79 but their reasons rest on
nothing more substantial than the same inability to conceive of a
middle ground between an action in rem and an action in personam
that led the Delaware court to perpetrate one of the more egregious
injustices of modern times. 80° Local creditors might regret the absence of the compulsion that the usual practice exerts upon the
defendant to appear generally; but since they now have available
no such remedy in the federal courts, they can hardly complain
with good grace if the remedy is made available in limited form.' 8 '
178 RESTATEMENT, JuDGMENTS § 40; Cheshire National Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14
(1916); Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co., 285 Fed. 214 (6th Cir. 1922)
(removal case).
In libels in rem in admiralty, the owner of the vessel seized may appear and defend
the in rem cause, and may procure the vessel's release by giving security, without subjecting himself to personal liability. See 2 BENEuxcr oN ADMIRALTY 414 (6th ed., Knauth
1940) [citing The City of Atlanta, 17 F.2d 311 (S.D. Ga. 1927); The Santa Cecilia, 1927
A.M.C. 80 (D. Ore. 1927); The Panama City, 1936 A.M.C. 569 (D. Mass. 1936)]; GILMORE
& BLACK, THE LAW OF ADmmALTY 511-12 (1957) [citing The Monte A, 12 F. 331 (S.D.N.Y.
1882); The Nora, 181 F. 845 (S.D. Fla. 1910)]. But cf. GILMoRE & BLACK, supra, at 652-54
[citing The Fairisle (Dean v. Waterman S.S. Co.), 76 F. Supp. 27 (D. Md.), aff'd 171 F.2d
408 (4th Cir. 1948); The Minnetonka, 146 F. 509 (2d Cir. 1906); Mosher v. Tate, 182 F.2d
475 (9th Cir. 1950); and the dissenting opinion of Judge Clark in Logue Stevedoring Co.
v. The Dalzellance, 198 F.2d 369, 373 (2d Cir. 1952)]. Gilmore and Black view with
approbation what they regard as the tendency of the rule permitting defense of the in
rem cause without personal liability to break down in recent years. Id. at 652, 654.
179 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
12.13 (2d ed. 1948); Blume, Actions Quasi in Rem
Under Section 1655, Title 28, U.S.C., 50 MicH. L. REV. 1, 24 (1951).
180 See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 US. 94 (1921).
181 This suggests the question whether provision for limited appearance in diversity
cases, where the state law makes no such provision, would conflict with the Erie doctrine
as it has been applied, Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949);
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 US. 541 (1949). Adequate investigation
of the question would be beyond the scope of this paper; but it may be suggested that if
the Erie doctrine is not offended by the total unavailability of the remedy in diversity
cases when it is available in state courts, see 7 MooRes FamnAw PRAcricE 1 64.09 (2d ed.
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Attachment and garnishment are remedies that are necessary and
proper for protection of the interests of local people having claims
against nonresidents; their absence from the armory of the federal
courts in original civil actions is regrettable; but the limited appearance offers a just way of mitigating the hardship to the defendant, and thus of allaying the fears of those who, like Mr. Justice
Story in 1818,12 may look upon these remedies as harsh and
oppressive.
It is to be hoped that the Court, through the exercise of its rulemaking power, will rectify the anomalous incapacity which it unfortunately inflicted on the district courts in earlier years in the
exercise of its ordinary judicial function. 8 3
1955), it would not logically be offended if the remedy were available in diversity cases
in limited form.
On the other hand, if the remedy is concurrently available, a difference in the conditions under which the defendant may appear would provide an inducement for the very
kind of forum-shopping that Erie was intended to prevent; and this seems the weightier
consideration. Hence any provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for limited
appearance might well be restricted to cases not within the reach of the Eric doctrine,
leaving the practice to be governed by state law where state-created rights are involved.
182 Picquet v. Swan, supra note 26.
183 If the garnishee is a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff, will the perfect

diversity required by Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), be spoiled?
Strangely, this question seems never to have arisen in the removal cases. In such cases it
might be disposed of by reference to the "separate and independent claim or cause of
action" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (c) (1958), although that provision has been strictly
construed, American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951). Cf. Note, 68 HAiv. L.
REv. 368 (1954). In original cases the problem may be more difficult. Note, however, that
in some attachment cases the garnishee is a purely nominal party, a mere custodian of the
defendant's property with no interest in the case; indeed, land, and in some cases chattels,
may be attached without summons to any garnishee. When a chose in action is involved
the garnishee may admit the obligation and not be a party to any controversy; if he denies
it, the controversy would appear to be between him and the nonresident defendant.
"Generally speaking, there are three parties to a writ of foreign attachment. The plaintiff,
or creditor, the defendant, or debtor; and the garnishee, who, in relation to the controversy
between the plaintiff and defendant, stands very much in the situation of a stake holder.
Between either of these parties, and himself, there is nothing adverse, unless he makes it
so by his own conduct. It is perfectly immaterial to him, which of the parties succeeds.
He is only to act bona fide, by discovering what property of the defendant is in his hands;
and as he cannot himself, decide between the contending parties, he cannot deliver over the
property to either, without the judgment of the court. The proceedings therefore against
him, are merely auxiliary to the principal suit, and are intended to secure the end for
which it was instituted." Graighle v. Notnagle, 10 Fed. Cas. 948, 949 (No. 5679) (C.C.D. Pa.
1816). (In this case the same individual was plaintiff and garnishee.) Cf. the third-party
practice under F.D. R. Civ. P. 14, Morrell v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 29 F. Supp.
757 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Friend v. Middle Atlantic Transportation Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.
1946); HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL CouRrs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTM 937-43 (1953);
and cf. the statutory interpleader proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1958); Sanders v. Armour
Fertilizer Works, note 169 supra.
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